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Abstract 
 
Paying to view others’ answers is an emerging 
business model happening on Weibo, a Chinese 
version of Twitter. Yet, little is known about what 
drives people to pay to view others’ answers. Based on 
signaling theory and related literature, we develop a 
model to predict the viewership of paid-for answers. 
Using unique panel data of 417 question-to-answers, 
we find that answer providers’ Weibo level, the number 
of comments that the paid-for answer receives, as well 
as the question price positively affect the viewership of 
the paid-for answer. Our findings contribute to the 
literature and enlighten content providers and platform 
organization on how to facilitate individual users to 
commercialize content for profits.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Digital technologies and the Internet have liquefied 
information from its original physical form or device 
[1].  As a result, information can be easily shared and 
exchanged at an almost zero marginal cost [2]. 
Numerous new business models emerge, including 
Freemium for software and Paywalls for news content 
[3]. The key to such new business models is 
information good, that is, products that can be digitized 
[4].  
The main characteristic of an information good is 
that it is an experience good. It is difficult to detect its 
actual value before its use [4]. Significant uncertainty 
and risks exist and prevent consumers from paying for 
information goods. For example, people may receive a 
useless or even fraud answer for a concerned question. 
Thus, it is crucial to know what make consumers pay 
for such information goods. Past literature suggests 
multiple ways to price information goods [5, 6]. 
Offering quality cues and signals of information goods 
is one of the most popular ways to attract consumers 
[7]. 
Online question & answer (Q&A) provides an 
alternative way for users to acquire and share 
information [8]. The recently introduced function of 
paying for answers on some social media platforms has 
attracted practitioners’ attention and interest [9-11]. In 
December 2016, Weibo.com (one of the largest social 
media platforms in China) launched the new function 
of paid Q&A as a way for users to interact with their 
followers [12]. In such platforms, those users who 
provide answers are answer providers, while those 
users who ask questions and pay for them are question 
askers. Other users who want to see an answer need to 
pay RMB 1, the fee of viewership. One viewership is 
worth RMB 1. From this perspective, the paid-for 
answer to the question is a type of information good. 
Following our above discussion, we want to 
understand what drives users to pay for paid-for 
answers on social media platforms. 
Similar to other types of information goods, the use 
of quality cues could be important to the consumption 
of answers- in this case, seen as answer viewership [6]. 
Unlike what happens with other types of information 
goods, paying to view answers is not available on other 
social media platforms. Question askers and answer 
providers reside in a social network where users have 
existing relationships. Characteristics, e.g., answer 
providers’ social network statuses, may affect the 
viewership of answers [13]. Furthermore, the 
interactions between other users and paid-for answers 
could also signal the value of answers [14] and 
potentially affect their viewership. However, previous 
literature has not studied information goods in the 
context of social media platforms. Existing theories on 
information goods have not considered the impacts of 
social networking and social interactions on the 
consumption of information goods (answer viewership 
in our study). Thus, there is a need for investigating 
what contributes to the viewership of paid-for answers 
(a unique type of information goods) on social media 
platforms. 
This study aims to address the literature gap by 
answering this research question: What factors 
influence the viewership of paid-for answers on social 
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media platforms? We will use signaling theory as the 
theoretical lens to guide our selection of independent 
variables. As per signaling theory, individuals will 
search for various signals to decide whether or not to 
act [15, 16]. In the context of paid Q&A on social 
media platforms, as discussed above, three salient 
types of signals exist, i.e., (1) signals from question 
features, (2) signals from answer providers, and (3) 
signals from social interaction between users and the 
answer. Based on our literature review and signaling 
theory, we develop a model that explains how the three 
types of signals affect the viewership of paid answers. 
We collected a unique panel data of 417 paid 
Q&As from Weibo Ask for 23 weeks. A total of 9591 
observations were used to estimate the model. Panel 
data help researchers make causal inferences from non-
experimental data. We find that signals from answer 
providers (e.g., their social media status (level) and the 
number of followers), signals from question features 
(i.e., question price), and signals from social 
interactions (i.e., the number of comments received) 
significantly affect the viewership of paid-for answers. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we 
review related literature. Then, we hypothesize the 
relationship between identified factors and answer 
viewership. Subsequently, the research describes the 
methodology and data analysis results. Finally, we 
conclude by discussing the expected contributions and 
implications for theory and practice.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
This section introduces the theoretical foundation 
of this paper. We first describe the paid Q&A- Weibo 
Q&A. Subsequently, we introduce the dynamics of 
information goods market. Then, we present the 
signaling theory as our theoretical lens. We identify 
various signals that can be used to decide whether to 
pay to view the answers. 
 
2.1. Paid Q&A in Weibo Q&A 
  
Our research context is the paid Q&A in 
Weibo.com, one of the most popular social media 
platforms in China. It had 297 million monthly active 
users and 132 million daily active users in Sept 2016 
[17]. Moreover, there are 0.19 million users who were 
certified celebrities, opinion leaders or specialists in 
various industries. On average, each certified user had 
over 0.1 million followers. This platform allows users 
to post, share and evaluate the content on social 
networks, such as news, original posts, articles, photos, 
music, and videos. Consequently, this platform has rich 
user-generated content. In December 2016, Weibo 
launched its new service, Weibo Q&A, supporting 
mobile device access [9]. Answer providers answer the 
questions via long texts. Only 500 high-quality users 
including opinion leaders or specialists in various 
walks of life were invited first to use this new service 
of Weibo Q&A [18]. At the end of July 2017, there 
were 36,712 users registered as answer providers while 
only 18,938 had answered one or more questions. 
Compared to other platforms, Weibo Ask is not only a 
Q&A system but also a channel for sharing content. 
In paid Q&A, stakeholders include the platform, 
question askers, answer providers, and answer viewers. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship among the three 
stakeholders. The platform charges 10% fees of each 
transactions. Answer providers are those users who 
register for the Q&A service. They set the price for 
their answering service. After the answer provider 
replies to a question, the question with an inserted link 
to the paid-for answer will be published on Weibo. 
People who are interested in the answers need to pay 
RMB 1 to view the answer, who are called answer 
viewers. Each viewership receives RMB 1 from an 
answer viewer. The answer provider and question 
asker will equally share the viewership revenue. Weibo 
takes a 10% commission on all transactions, which is 
not included in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. The Business Model of Weibo 
Q&A 
 
The prices set by each answer provider vary. A 
question asker propose a question to one answer 
provider with prepayment and will obtain a full refund 
if the nominated answer provider does not reply within 
three days. After the answer has been published, the 
question asker can also profit from the viewership of 
answer viewers. Charging for viewership expires 
within three months since the answer provider 
responses to the question. 
The key research question about this business 
model is what makes other users pay to view answers 
to others’ questions. Past literature on information 
goods can be useful here to enlighten our study. 
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2.2. Dynamic Information Goods Market 
 
In a dynamic market for information goods, the 
commodity can be exchanged indefinitely [19, 20]. 
Although many indicators, such as a good reputation of 
the seller or the recognized information quality, would 
mitigate the information asymmetry problem [21], 
users’ willingness on pay for the information goods 
can be affected by the following two types of 
situations. 
On one hand, an information good is a type of 
unique commodity whose value declines over time. 
This intrinsic nature of diminishing value undermines 
users’ interest in gaining it. Meanwhile, uncertainty 
caused by information asymmetries can be reduced 
[21] by increasing environmental cues and information 
leakage. However, if more positive cues manifest its 
quality, the willingness to purchase the product might 
be strengthened. Therefore, time is an important 
determinant of the value of information goods [20-23]. 
On the other hand, an information good is 
experiential. Users can only know its value after they 
use it [6]. Paying before use is risky. This is especially 
the case in the context of paid Q&A. Viewers can only 
know the content after payment. Before deciding to 
pay for the viewership, users may need to pick up 
different cues and signals to decide. 
Past literature suggests that individuals use the 
associated signals to make their decision on 
information good purchase, and that signaling theory is 
useful to address information uncertainties [24]. This 
theory has also been applied to the context of user-
generated content for online reviews [25]. 
Furthermore, signaling theory is also a useful lens to 
study information goods [25], and will be used in this 
study. 
 
2.3. Signaling Theory 
 
Signaling theory is useful for describing user 
behavior when two parties have access to asymmetric 
information [24, 26]. Information asymmetry exists 
when individuals or organizations withhold their 
private information [26]. Asymmetry in information 
about quality and information about intent will cause 
moral hazards that result from an individual’s using 
asymmetric information for their own benefits. 
Signaling is an important mechanism for reducing 
information asymmetry [24, 27]. Signalers will send 
out signals of quality and intent so that the receivers 
can observe and interpret signals and then react as 
signalers expect  [24]. This theory has been extended 
to social and economic exchanges and proposes that 
companies will send out various signals to consumers 
so that consumers can choose to purchase from them 
[25]. Thus, substantial research areas have applied it 
for exploring user choices. For example, Dimoka et al.  
[16] identified the influence of product uncertainty and 
seller uncertainty on price premiums in online markets. 
They found that positive feedback ratings of the seller 
have a significant effect on price premiums and 
product uncertainty has a higher effect on price 
premiums than seller uncertainty. 
Past studies have proposed a set of information 
signals which can attenuate the problem of product 
uncertainty and information asymmetry between 
consumers and products [27-29]. Pavlou and Dimoka’s 
research [28] identified several important types of 
information signals: (1) descriptions of online product 
(i.e., textual, visual, multimedia) and inherent 
characteristics of product (i.e., value and usage); (2) 
certification from third-party (i.e., warranty, ratings); 
(3) list price of product. In the context of Weibo Ask, 
similarly, we identify three relevant types of signals: 
(1) signals from answer providers, including social 
status on Q&A platforms (i.e., Weibo level), and social 
influence (i.e., number of followers) in the platform; 
(2) signals from users’ social interaction with Q&A, 
such as commenting and sharing Q&A; (3) signals 
from question features, such as the question price. 
 
3. Theoretical model and hypothesis 
 
Based on past literature and signaling theory, we 
develop a model shown in Figure 2. We use signaling 
theory as the overarching theory to derive the general 
logic. For each construct and relationship, we rely on 
other related literatures to ground specific arguments. 
 
Figure 2. Research Model 
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3.1. Signaling Theory 
 
Past literature suggests that social media status is an 
important indicator for users to generate useful content 
online [8, 30]. Such status hierarchies can be reflected 
in levels, tenure, badges that a user has [30]. To 
achieve the goal of a higher level on such platforms, 
the user will invest extra efforts in creating high quality 
content [30]. In other words, users with a higher social 
media level are more likely to produce original, 
unique, specialized content. 
In the context of product sales, past literature 
suggests that seller reputation increases the abundance 
of information [31], and can effectively alleviate 
information asymmetry between sellers and buyers 
[21]. Good reputation can affect buyer’s perception of 
the general quality through fulfilling the contractual 
commitment during the transactions [32]. In the 
context of social media, Weibo level is an important 
indicator of answer providers’ reputation [8]. Levels 
can also represent their past contribution and their 
distinction on such social media platforms [33]. 
Usually, users with a higher level will not reduce the 
quality of their contribution to hurt their reputation [34, 
35]. In this sense, Weibo level can be a strong quality 
signal of content generated by the answer providers. 
Based on the above reasoning, we can easily argue 
that an answer provider with a higher Weibo level is 
more likely to produce high-quality content. Such a 
quality signal will motivate others to pay for viewing 
their answers. Thus, we hypothesize 
 
H1a: The level of the answer provider on Weibo 
positively affects the number of viewership of a paid-
for answer. 
 
Another important aspect of social media status is 
the number of followers [33]. Past literature in 
knowledge contribution suggests that people tend to be 
prosocial and contribute quality content to online 
platforms when the audience size is large [36, 37]. A 
larger audience size will increase the image and 
influence power of the contributors. As a result, they 
will continue contributing high quality content for their 
targeted audience. Conversely, in the face of a small 
audience size, individuals believe that their 
contributions are less likely to be noticed by the public, 
and will have fewer incentives to improve its quality 
[37]. This argument is in line with existing literature in 
social media. Researchers argue that when individuals 
have more followers, they feel they have more power 
to influence others [34, 38]. As a result, they tend to 
care about their behavior and tend to contribute quality 
content [34]. As per signaling theory, such quality 
signals will encourage others to pay to view their 
answers. 
Moreover, past literature on social media has 
suggested that those who have a large number of 
followers will have a huge influence on their 
followers’ brand choice and voting behaviors [38, 39]. 
Borrowing from this logic, answer providers who have 
a large number of followers will have a huge influence 
on their followers. Their followers will tend to pay for 
viewing their answers to express their support and 
know more about the answer providers. This suggests a 
positive link between the number of followers and the 
viewership of answers. 
Combining the argument together, we expect that 
the number of followers that the answer providers have 
will positively affect the viewership of their answers 
via the tendency to maintain their social media status 
and their social influence. Thus, we hypothesize 
 
H1b: The number of followers of the answer 
provider on Weibo positively affects the number of 
viewership of a paid-for answer. 
 
3.2. Signals from Social Interaction 
 
Signals from social interaction can serve as the 
third-party certification for the content [28]. Online 
word-of-mouth is a critical tool to decrease information 
asymmetry for experienced goods [40, 41]. Past 
literature suggests that online reviews convey 
reviewers’ evaluation of features and quality of a 
product and satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their 
consumption experience [42]. Such product and 
consumption experience information will significantly 
reduce product uncertainty and thus improve product 
sales. Past literature noticed the positive link between 
online reviews and product sales in various contexts 
[43]. For example, Chevalier and Mayzlin [44] found 
the number of reviews has a significant impact on 
product sales on e-commerce websites.  
The underlying mechanism for the relationship is 
called awareness effect [41]. A large volume of 
reviews increases public awareness of the object being 
reviewed [41]. On one hand, a large volume of reviews 
arouses users' awareness of the existence of such 
information goods. On the other hand, a large volume 
of reviews signifies the popularity of such information 
goods and the hinted quality [45]. As a result, more 
people will be intrigued to buy such information goods 
[46]. Similar results have been found in the context of 
mobile apps [47]. 
Similarly, the number of comments that a paid-for 
answer receives represents its popularity and also 
signifies its innate quality. As per signaling theory, this 
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will increase the likelihood of the answer to be viewed 
by others. Hence, we hypothesize 
 
H2a: The number of comments that the paid-for 
answer receives positively affects the number of its 
viewership. 
 
Others’ messages being forwarded to one’s own 
network of followers is critical for the transmission of 
such messages [48]. If a message has been forwarded 
many times, it indicates that the message will reach to 
more users’ social networking. The probability of more 
people viewing the answer will increase. As a result, it 
may receive more viewership. It is similar to the 
awareness effect that commenting brings. 
Furthermore, other users’ forwarding represents 
they are endorsing the message [49]. This will help 
increase the credibility of such a message. As per 
signaling theory, credibility signals will improve 
individuals’ likelihood of purchasing such a product 
[24].  
In Weibo, users tend to read postings forwarded by 
their friends [50]. According to the report of Sina 
Weibo Data Center (2013), around 90% Weibo users 
would like to forward useful, valuable or interesting 
posts [51]. For the paid-for answers, if the question 
with a link to the paid-for answer has been forwarded 
frequently, it will be more likely to notify more people 
to pay for viewing the answer to the question. Thus, we 
expect: 
 
H2b: The number of times that a paid-for answer has 
been forwarded on Weibo positively affects the number 
of its viewership. 
 
3.3. Price 
 
Price is always an important indicator of inherent 
quality studied in various contexts [24, 52]. Past 
literature on information goods suggests that its value 
derives from the content [53]. Price indicates the value 
and the quality. As per signaling theory, this should 
positively affect the sales of such information goods.  
In the context of online Question and Answer, the 
inherent problem is that questions and answers are free 
and thus public goods. Their quality cannot be 
guaranteed. For example, in Yahoo! Answers, there are 
823,966 questions and answers generated every day, 
but only 17.6% of them were satisfactory [54]. In order 
to receive high-quality information quickly, users tend 
to find reliable experts from paid Q&A systems [55]. 
Recent studies have shown that financial incentives are 
helpful in soliciting the user content generation [56]. 
Financial payment is a way to compensate for their 
effort and knowledge put in the content [57, 58]. The 
amount of financial incentives, i.e., price, could 
provide a hint about how much effort the answer 
provider has put into the answer [59] and hence its 
quality. This suggests that price of the answer to the 
question should positively affect its viewership. Prior 
studies on paid answers have identified a positive link 
between price and answer quality [59, 60]. For 
example, Haper et al. [60] found that paid answers are 
judged with higher answer quality. Combining the 
above argument, we hypothesize 
 
H3: The question price on Weibo Q&A positively 
affects the number of viewership of its paid-for answer. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
4.1. Research setting 
 
This study is targeted at paid social Q&A platform. 
We select the most noted paid Q&A platform in China, 
Weibo Q&A as our research site. It is based on the 
largest and most popular Chinese content-sharing 
platform where the number of monthly active users 
grew to 411 million in March 2018, and 93% are 
represented by mobile users [61]. 
 
4.2. Data Collection 
 
We employed the keyword search method for 
obtaining all answered questions which are sorted by 
latest updated time. Update here refers to the users’ 
interaction activities such as forwarding, giving likes 
or commenting the Q&A. The latest interacted Q&A 
ranks first. For each Q&A, the data set includes a web 
link, price, and numbers of viewership, comments, and 
reposting of Q&A, as well as the Weibo level, numbers 
of followers and postings of the answer provider and 
question asker. We started data collection on Sep 15, 
2017, and obtained unique Q&A in the following five 
days, resulting in 493 pieces of unique Q&A in total 
and collected data sets every three days until Nov 26, 
2017. In total, we have collected 23 times till answer 
viewership charge expires three months since its 
release. After removing those which were deleted from 
the platform during our data collection, 417 pieces of 
Q&A remained with a panel dataset of 9591 
observations. 
 
4.3. Control Variables 
 
We also include control variables that may affect 
viewers to pay for answers, i.e., answerer followings, 
asker followings, asker followers and asker postings. 
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Answerer followings and asker followings are the 
numbers of users whom answer providers and question 
askers follow on Weibo. Asker followers are the 
number of followers of question askers.  Asker postings 
represent the number of postings of question askers 
while Answer postings mean the number of postings of 
answer providers. Descriptive information about all 
variables is listed in Table 1. 
 
4.4. Model Specification and Statistical Method 
 
We tested the hypotheses proposed with a panel 
regression model. The subscript i in the equation 
represents the Q&A and subscript i represents the time. 
Viewershipsit  
     = β1Log(Answerer_followeri(t-1))  
     + β2Weibo_leveli(t-1) + β3Forwardingi(t-1)  
     + β4Commentsi(t-1) + β5Pricei + 
     + β6Answerer_postingsi(t-1)  
     + β7Asker_followingsi(t-1) 
     + β8Asker_followersi(t-1) 
     + β9Asker_postingsi(t-1) + εi(t-1) 
 
where Viewershipsit is the number of the ith Q&A 
viewed at the time t ; Answerer_followeri(t-1) is the 
number of followers of the blogger who answered the 
ith Q&A at the time t-1; Weibo_leveli(t-1) is the social 
status of the blogger  who answered the ith Q&A at the 
time t-1; Answerer_postingsi(t-1) is the number of tweets 
of the blogger who answered the ith Q&A at time t-1; 
Forwardingi(t-1) is the frequency of forwarding the ith 
Q&A at the time t-1; Commentsi(t-1) is the number of 
comments of the ith Q&A at the time t-1; Pricei is the 
money that the asker pay for the ith Q&A, which is 
constant over time. Answerer_followingsi(t-1) is the 
number of users of the blogger who answered the ith 
Q&A following at the time t-1; Asker_followingsi(t-1) is 
the number of users of the blogger who asked the ith 
Q&A following at the time t-1; Asker_followersi(t-1) is 
the number of fans of the blogger who asked the ith 
Q&A at the time t-1; Asker_postingsi(t-1) is the number 
of tweets of the blogger who asked the ith Q&A at time 
t-1; εit is the random error term while β is a parameter 
vector. 
Considering the highly skewed of the values for 
answerer followers, we have performed a natural log-
transformation. Apart from the factors we have focused 
on, some unobservable factors may confound our 
results. When these factors are stable over (e.g., 
blogger’s effort put in answering questions), fixed or 
random effects panel data models can be properly 
employed to account for endogeneity issues [62]. 
Further, random effects model has a distinct advantage 
of allowing to include time-invariant factors into 
regression models. We are interested into the effect of 
price on the dependent variable, and the price is 
constant for each Q&A. Therefore, random effects 
model is preferred in our study. 
 
5. Analysis and Results 
 
We employed the software STATA 15 to perform a 
random-effects analysis. Descriptive and correlation 
results of variables are shown in Tables 1 and 2 
respectively. To examine the potential multicollinearity 
problem, we computed variance inflation factors 
(VIFs). The VIFs for all variables in the analysis 
ranged from 1.08 to 1.83, ruling out potential 
multicollinearity problems [63]. 
 
5.1. Hypotheses Testing 
 
We estimated a random effects model of 
viewership of paid-for answers on the main effects of 
signals from answer providers, social interaction, and 
question feature with robust standard errors. Results 
are shown in Table 3. The reason we choose a random 
effects model instead of a fixed effects model is that 
we want to test the effects of price which is time-
invariant for each question.  
As for signals from answer providers, the Weibo 
level positively affect the number of viewership (β2 = 
2.36, p<0.01), providing support for H1a. However, the 
number of followers of answer providers has no 
significant effect on the viewership, suggesting H1b 
not supported. As for signals from social interaction, 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Viewership 284.58 496.18 0 5036 
Weibo Level 40.91 6.56 12 48 
Ans_followers 1166128 1770421 6928 11784685 
Ans_postings 23955.91 24487.13 179 96070 
Forwarding 11.00 24.99 0 376 
Comments 14.67 31.62 0 559 
Price 107.59 249.08 1 2198 
Ans_followings 857 851 31 5912 
Ask_followings 336 521 0 6529 
Ask_followers 9941 122431 0 2459823 
Ask_postings 1059 3078 0 35567 
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the number of comments has a positive effect on the viewership of paid answers (β4 = 1.37, p<0.05),
indicating that H2a is supported. However, the number 
of times that the question has been forwarded has no 
effect on the viewership, suggesting H2b not support. 
As for the signal from question feature, the price of the 
question has a positive impact on the dependent 
variable (β6 = 1.18, p<0.001), supporting our 
hypothesis of H3. 
Table 2. Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.Viewership 1 
         
 
2.Weibo Level 0.11 1 
        
 
3.Ans_followers 0.10 0.55 1 
       
 
4.Ans_postings -0.04 0.49 0.57 1 
      
 
5.Forwarding 0.26 0.09 0.12 0.27 1 
     
 
6.Comments 0.36 -0.19 0.05 -0.09 0.16 1 
    
 
7.Price 0.61 0.12 0.06 -0.06 0.13 0.14 1 
   
 
8.Ans_followings -0.18 0.23 0.12 0.29 0.00 -0.13 -0.13 1 
  
 
9.Ask_followings -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 1 
 
 
10.Ask_followers 0.12 -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 0.15 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.07 1  
11.Ask_postings 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.15 -0.02 0.24 0.28 1 
 
Table 3. Data Analysis 
IV 
DV= Viewership 
1 2 Results 
Weibo Level  2.36** H1a supported 
Log 
(Ans_followers) 
 3.05 H1b not supported 
Forwarding  0.16 H2a not supported 
Comments  1.37* H2b supported 
Price  1.18*** H3 supported 
Ans_postings -0.00 -0.00*  
Ans_followings -0.01 0.00  
Ask_followings -0.00 -0.00  
Ask_followers 0.00 0.00  
Ask_postings 0.00 0.00  
Fixed Effects No No  
R2 0.03 0.42  
Number of 
observations 
9591 
Significance level: *p <0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001. 
 
 
5.2 Robustness Check 
 
To test the robustness of our result, we have 
estimated our data using a fixed effect model with 
robust standard erros. Results are shown in Table 4. 
Control variables are not included. 
From Table 4, we can see that our results across 
different methods at large. Price is constant for each 
question and hence not available in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Robustness Check 
Independent Variables DV= Viewership 
Weibo Level 1.93** 
Log (Ans_followers) 0.55 
Forwarding 0.15 
Comments 1.34* 
Fixed Effects Yes 
R2 0.15 
Number of observations 9591 
Significance level: *p <0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
This study drew upon the signaling theory to 
examine the impacts of different signals on the    
viewership of a paid answer.  We investigate signals 
from multiple sources including the answer provider, 
questions and peer feedback. We then test their 
impacts with a unique panel dataset. 
The present findings show that answer providers’ 
Weibo level, the number of comments that a paid-for 
answer receives, as well as the question price 
positively affect the viewership of paid Q&A. 
Surprisingly, more followers of an answer provider 
and Q&A being forwarded more times do not 
obviously receive more users’ attention.      
 Our findings have made contributions to existing 
literature in three significant ways. First, we applied 
signaling theory to paid Q&A market for discovering 
useful information signals. To the best of our 
knowledge, prior literature attempted to employ this 
theory in various settings [24, 27] but not paid Q&A 
systems. This has extended the applicability of 
signaling theory to an emerging but important 
context. Second, we have developed a context-
specific framework for paid Q&A and identifies 
unique constructs. Our study provides a first attempt 
to study this phenomenon. This fills our gaps in our 
understanding about this new phenomenon. 
Furthermore, our study can pave the way for future 
research. Third, we have extended past literature in 
user generated content on social media platforms 
[37]. Predominant past literature has focused on the 
voluntary contribution of content on such platforms. 
We are the first to study paid content on social media 
platforms, charging others for answering their 
questions. 
Practitioners may also benefit from the results of 
this study. Content producers can pay more attention 
to strengthen and improve the signals we discovered 
in this study when they want to attract more users to 
pay for the answer. Based on that, the platform 
organization can also direct their marketing strategy 
towards these identified and examined attributes. For 
example, since the level of answerer on Weibo is of 
great significant effect on information consumption, 
it is critical to building effective level ranking 
mechanism. 
Future research can study how answer providers 
price for their answers. It is still unknown what the 
optimal pricing strategy is for such information 
goods. Furthermore, since we collected the data from 
a subset of questions from this platform, it may suffer 
from self-selection bias. Future research can collect 
more data from this site and validate whether our 
findings still hold. In addition, asking a right question 
may help question askers profit from answer 
viewership. Future research can study the behavior of 
question askers using lead user theory [64]. 
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